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Abstract 
This article analyses efficiency and quality levels in Spanish local governments and 
their determining factors through the application of the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) methodology. It aims to discover to what extent inefficiency arises from both 
quality considerations and external factors beyond the organisation’s control, or 
alternatively, how much inefficiency is due to inadequate resource management. As a 
component of inadequate resource management, we test the existence of political-
budgetary cycles in the temporal evolution of inefficiencies. The results show that on 
the whole there is still a wide margin within which local government efficiency and 
quality levels could be increased, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency 
is due to exogenous or non-controllable factors. In particular, it has been found that the 
size of the municipality, the per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants and the amount 
of commercial activity are some of the factors related with local government efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The constitution of the European Monetary Union has implied the unavoidable 
requirement to control the deficits of the public sector budgets for member states. This 
means that there is substantial pressure to reduce expenses (obviously, it can also be a 
question of increasing revenues, but we deal herein with expenses). Reducing expenses 
can be achieved by making three decisions: a) reducing the provision of public services, 
b) reducing their quality or c) controlling the inefficiencies found.  
 
In this paper, we focus on the third measure because an increase in productivity will be 
decisive in the sustainability of public sector organisations, and it will entail the smallest 
social impact at the same time. An increase in efficiency and productivity is no easy 
task, and from a socio-economic point of view, there are times when their effects are 
precisely the opposite to those desired. An example of this is the following scenario: let 
us assume that public managers are defining the strategic decisions to curb deficits in a 
local transport service. The decisions to be made are: a) elimination of the non-
profitable lines from a financial point of view, b) reduction of the service frequency and 
c) increase in productivity (by either increasing the number of kilometres per employee 
or the hours of use per bus) without the quality of the services being affected. Decision 
a) can involve major social costs if certain population segments are left without a basic 
public service; decision b) implies a deterioration of quality and it can give rise to a 
supplementary deficit on a long-term basis; finally, decision c) preserves output and 
quality of service while attempting to increase efficiency and productivity.  
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This example illustrates the main objective of this article: i.e. to observe what  
possibilities there are of increasing the efficiency of a sample of Spanish municipalities 
by trying to reduce the excess of input consumption, while at the same time maintaining 
the services provided to the population and verifying what the trade-offs exist between 
efficiency and quality when we account for quality variables. Considering the short- and 
the long-term temporal dimension of efficiency is also an objective that will be dealt 
with in the following pages. 
 
Local government plays an important role in the provision of public services1, and 
forms a sub-sector that has taken on more responsibilities over time (see Table 1 for the 
responsibility levels of central, regional and local administration). This in turn has led to 
an accumulation of operations, and a consequent increase in expenditure and greater 
specific weight in the country’s economy. In the Spanish experience, following the 
approval of the 1978 Constitution, important changes have been experienced which 
have led to an increase in the responsibilities of state and local governments in the 
provision of public services.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Local government is precisely our main objective. In this paper we analyse the levels of 
both efficiency and quality in these organisations, and determine what financial, socio-
economic and budgetary characteristics are common in local governments with a similar 
efficiency. In this way, we will be able to discover whether inefficiencies can be 
explained by external factors, and as such, whether they are beyond the control of the 
                                                 
1 For an excellent study of public sector efficiency, see Fox (2001).  
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authorities, or they are due solely to bad management. A further possibility is that 
inefficiency may be due to a combination of both aspects. 
 
If we take into account the data we have, as set out below (in Section 3), part of the 
variables related to quality are categorical. As they are non-continuous variables, a 
suitable procedure to deal with this type of variable has had to be established. We have 
taken the proposal set out by Banker and Morey (1987) from existing alternatives as we 
consider it to be the most suitable because it takes into account the characteristics of our 
sample.  
 
The following pages are divided into five sections. Section 2 sets out the methodology 
used in the efficiency analysis. The sample of local authorities analysed and the 
variables defined are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of the 
empirical analysis and Section 5 analyses factors affecting the inefficiency found. 
Finally, Section 6 presents the essential conclusions drawn from the study. 
 
 
2. Description of the methodology 
 
The choice of the DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) model for the analysis of local 
government efficiency is owing to its conceptual simplicity and its versatility, both of 
which allow many of the difficulties inherent in the evaluation of the management in 
public services to be eliminated. Amongst these difficulties, the multi-product nature 
and the fact that market prices do not exist are the most important issues when 
evaluating public service institutions. 
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Although there is an abundant presence of literature, involving empirical applications 
based on the analysis of efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis methodology to 
the public sector2, studies into local government efficiency are still limited. For a survey 
of efficiency in local government see Worthington and Dollery (2000).  
 
The DEA model is a mathematical programming model that enables an efficiency 
analysis to be carried out, which is subject to a series of restrictions. More often than not 
within the public sector, outputs are either totally or partially set externally, and for this 
reason, it makes more sense to evaluate efficiency in terms of the minimisation of 
inputs. Therefore, the mathematical formulation of the DEA in the so-called input 
orientation version, can be expressed as follows:  
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where θ represents the coefficient which proportionally reduces the inputs of the 
evaluated unit, and its value measures the efficiency of unit ‘i’ subject to evaluation 
(Decision-Making Unit, or DMU, is the term used in the literature on this subject). X 
and Y are defined as the input and output matrices which contain all the units (DMUs) to 
                                                 
2 Such as public schools (Noulas and Ketkar, 1998; Ray, 1991), hospitals (Chang, 1998; Pavlova et al., 
2004), police service (Diez-Ticio and Mancebon, 2002) and courts (Pedraja and Salinas, 1996), among 
others.  
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be evaluated, while xi and yi represent observed inputs and outputs corresponding to the 
DMU under evaluation. Finally, λ is the activity vector which describes the importance 
of the DMUs considered to determine the virtual reference which is used as a 
comparison in order to evaluate unit ‘i’. 
 
Programme [1] has to be defined the same number of times as there are units to be 
evaluated (once for each DMU). The DEA methodology defines a linear programme 
that compares each producer with the “best” producers which make up the “best 
practice frontier”. The key to the analysis consists of finding the best virtual DMU for 
each real DMU. The model sets out with two sets of restrictions: the first ( yY i≥λ ), 
forces the virtual DMU to produce at least as many outputs as those obtained by the 
DMU under analysis. The second restriction ( λθ Xxi ≥ ) enables us to determine the 
lowest possible input consumption. 
 
By resolving the linear programming corresponding to each one of the units under 
study, we obtain a coefficient θ for each DMU. If θi is equal to one, then the DMU is 
defined as efficient,3 while in the remaining cases, i.e. when θi < 1, it indicates an 
inefficient performance in relation to the units located at the frontier. 
 
The underlying technology in programme [1] exhibits constant returns to scale. In other 
words, there is no restriction to compare DMUs with a low (high) size with other units 
of a superior (inferior) size. In this way, the activity vector λ shows whether the best 
practice frontier is made up of either smaller (if λ>1) or larger sized units (if λ<1) than 
                                                 
3 The literature describes this situation as one of poor efficiency. A more robust definition, based on 
Pareto’s optimality concept, requires additional conditions. An excellent presentation of the various 
notions of efficiency can be found in Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000). 
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the evaluated DMU. More suitable technological assumptions can also be introduced. 
Thus, if we wish to consider only units of a similar size to that of the evaluated DMU, 
we can introduce the assumption that the variable returns to scale. This only requires 
adding one further restriction to programme [1]: 
 
1
1
=∑
=
I
i
λ    [2] 
 
 
Expressions [1] and [2] describe the standard DEA methods. In our case however, an 
adaptation is required in order to introduce two specific aspects: a) the consideration of 
quality as a new variable, which differs to those of inputs and outputs and b) the 
consideration of part or all of the quality variables as qualitative variables. We now go 
on to discuss how we defined the model that is implemented. 
 
 
3. Sample selection and variables definition 
 
In order to carry out the analysis, statistical information from the Valencian Audit 
Commission and the Spanish Ministry for Public Administration was used. Outputs 
were obtained from information compiled in a survey of local infrastructure and 
equipment devised by the Spanish Ministry for Public Administration (MAP), while 
inputs came from the budget of local authorities taken from the Valencian Audit 
Commission. The sample was thus made up of 258 municipalities and the period under 
analysis was 1992 to 1995. 
 
 8
It is important to highlight the fact that when the data were selected, a decision to use 
real expenditures and revenues (observed net charges and observed net liabilities) 
instead of forecasts was made, although in some cases, these were at the price to be paid 
to be up to date due to publication delays. However, the use of budgeted data would 
have greatly distorted the conclusions, since it is well known that in terms of general 
bureaucratic behaviour, budgeted figures generally underestimate expenditure and 
overestimate revenues. 
 
In output specifications we differentiate production variables on the one hand, and  
quality variables on the other. The information available on the variable of the quality of 
services provided is of a categorical nature (the quality of the services offered is 
arranged in three classifications: good, normal or bad). It is quantified using the 
proposal set out by Banker and Morey (1986), which involves breaking down the 
quality variable into two categorical variables: d1 and d2. Thus, the values taken by d1 
and d2 will be the following for one unit j: 
dj1 = dj2 = 0, if the quality is bad. 
dj1 =1 and dj2 = 0, if the quality is normal. 
    dj1 = dj2 = 1, if the quality is good. 
 
In terms of outputs, the specification of variables has been representative of the essential 
services provided by local councils. With the aim of setting limits on what essential 
services are, we firstly refer to Spanish Municipal Law where we have found the 
minimal services required (Table 2 contains these services). The descriptive statistics 
corresponding to these variables are presented  in Table 3. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Given the difficulty of quantifying public sector output, it is often essential to look for 
reasonable proxy variables. Initially, and based on the work of De Borger and Kerstens 
(1996a, b), Taïrou (2000) and Vanden Eeckaut (1993), the number of inhabitants is 
chosen to reflect the basic services provided to the local population. 
 
However, there are municipalities with specific situations (characterised by low 
population density, having a major road network, high quality public services) that 
require more ad hoc variables. This is the reason why alternative variables are worth 
considering as observed outputs. In order to analyse to what extent there are other 
variables explaining the cost variability for each municipality, we estimate a Cobb-
Douglas cost function as follows4: 
 
),,,,,,( 2154321 aayyyyyfTC =   [3] 
 
where, 
TC: Total cost 
y1: Population 
y2: Number of lighting points 
y3: Tons of waste collected  
y4: Street infrastructure surface area  
                                                 
4 The Cobb-Douglas cost function also includes input prices. However, as in De Borger and Kerstens 
(1996a), we do not have information about input prices. Accordingly, we ignore the variations in input 
prices. This assumption is not too unreasonable when the rigidity of salaries in the Spanish public sector 
is taken into account. 
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y5: Registered surface area of public parks  
a1: Citizens’ evaluation of quality: number of votes 
a2: Technical quality of public infrastructures 
 
The estimation of (3) has taken natural logarithms in order to determine a Cobb-
Douglas functional form and to express the coefficients as the cost elasticity indicator 
corresponding to each variable. Before we go on to estimate the regression models, we 
were interested in ascertaining the existence of any possible multicolinearity, and we 
analysed the degree of linear association between each pair of variables using Pearson’s 
linear correlation coefficient. The most outstanding result was that the variable 
"population" is that which presents the greatest correlation to the rest. Therefore, in 
order to avoid multicolinearity problems, we have estimated a model with the variable 
"population" on the one hand, while the rest of the variables are included in another 
model. The results of the multiple linear regression analysis are shown in Table 4.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The explanatory power of the regression models as a whole is good, since adjusted R2  
presents very high values. However, when the adjusted R2  for Model 2 (adjusted 
R2 =0.914) is compared with Model 1 (adjusted R2 =0.921), we can conclude that 
population is a very good variable to explain the variation in the dependent variable. 
However, we cannot take these results as conclusive because Model 1 presents a 
situation of slightly increasing returns to scale while Model 2 exhibits a technology with 
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decreasing returns to scale5. The use of ordinary least squares along with the presence of 
inefficiency may likely explain these apparently contradictory results. 
 
Before defining the input variables used, it should be pointed out that we chose to carry 
out two types of evaluation: short-term and long-term frontiers. The short-term frontier 
is referred to when a frontier for each year is estimated. On the other hand, when the 
long-term frontier is determined, the budget outcomes from the expenditure of 1992 to 
1995 are added, and the aggregated service provision process of this period is evaluated. 
In other words, by using terms set down by OECD (1997), we evaluate the efficiency 
within a long-term budgetary framework. 
 
There are two reasons for estimating both types of frontier. Firstly, it enables us to 
verify the existence of the so-called “political-budgetary cycles” (Rogo,1990) if 
significant differences are observed between the levels of annual efficiency and the 
accumulated value for the legislative period analysed. Secondly, as the number of votes 
in one of the specifications is obtained by the governing political party during the 
previous legislature, and is introduced as a quality “proxy”, it logically follows that this 
satisfaction derives from a whole legislative period, and not from one particular year. 
 
Thus, in order to determine local authority behaviour in the local government, three 
different combinations of DEA models have been applied which depend on the 
corresponding variables specification. These models are the following:  
 
- Model DEA 1, the output specifications taken are production variables.  
                                                 
5 In both models we can reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale. 
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- Model DEA 2 includes two quality attributes: a1, the variable "level of citizen 
satisfaction" (subjective appreciation of quality by the population), defined as the 
number of votes obtained in the current municipal elections by the party in power in 
the previous elections; and a2 as the variable "quality of services" (the objective 
quality of local authority infrastructures). 
- Finally, in Model DEA 3, all variables are included (both production and quality 
attributes). This is the most thorough model, which enables us to evaluate both 
efficiency and quality at the same time.  
 
INPUT VARIABLES:  
x1: Wages and salaries 
x2: Operating expenditure 
x3: Current and capital transfer 
x4: Capital expenditure 
 
OUTPUT VARIABLES CORRESPONDING TO MODEL DEA 1: 
y1: Population 
y2: Number of lighting points 
y3: Tons of waste collected  
y4: Street infrastructure surface area 
y5: Public parks surface area  
 
OUTPUT VARIABLES CORRESPONDING TO MODEL DEA 2: 
y1: Population 
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a1: Number of votes obtained in elections by the political party in power during the 
previous legislative period.  
a2: Quality of services (dichotomous: a21 and a22) 
 
OUTPUT VARIABLES CORRESPONDING TO MODEL DEA 3: 
y1: Population 
y2: Number of lighting points 
y3: Tons of waste collected 
y4: Street infrastructure surface area 
y5: Public parks surface area 
a1: Number of votes obtained in elections by the political party in power during the 
previous legislative period.  
a2: Quality of services (dichotomous: a21 and a22) 
 
4. Results obtained from the application of the efficiency and quality 
frontier to the sample of municipalities analysed 
 
In order to carry out the evaluation defined in the previous Section, programme [1] was 
first applied to all the local authorities in the sample. The coefficient obtained (with a 
technological assumption of constant returns to scale) enabled us to determine the so-
called Global Technical Efficiency coefficient (GTE). Programme [1] was applied once 
more, but the weight restrictions mentioned in Section 2 were introduced on this 
occasion, and the Pure Technical Efficiency coefficient (PTE) was obtained in a 
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technological context of variable returns to scale. Finally, the Scale Efficiency (SE) was 
determined by relating GTE and PTE (SE = GTE/PTE). 
 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 present a synthesis of the obtained results. GTE was between 66% and 
75%, PTE was between 75% and 89% and the inefficiency due to scale, caused by 
deviations from optimal size of the organisation, was around 8%-24%, depending on the 
different output specifications. In this way, the organisations have to accept a level of 
inefficiency that varies between the 77% point and the 92% point, which is furthermore  
difficult to correct owing to the fact that adjustment of the size of the organisation is 
complicated. 
 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
From the total sample, 201 municipalities are above optimal size, indicating that 
decreasing returns to scale prevail. In addition, in order to verify whether significant 
differences in efficiency levels occurred between the initial period and the final period, 
Wilcoxon’s non-parametric test was applied. The results indicate that the differences in 
averages between groups are significant at a reliability level of 90%. This test confirms 
the existence of the aforementioned political-budgetary cycles, consisting of an increase 
in spending in the final years of office of a given  political party. 
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After a global analysis, we now concentrate on the distribution of the coefficients 
according to size. GTE covers all organisations, irrespective of their size, and the results 
indicated that local authorities with populations of 5,000 and 20,000 showed a higher 
GTE in practically all the output specifications. Such a result could indicate this 
population band as being the optimum size for an organisation to be considered 
efficient. When considering the PTE coefficient, inefficiency grows in municipalities 
with a lower number of inhabitants. Out of those organisations with a population of over 
5,000, 21.33% are efficient in all output specifications, whereas only 15.93% of the 
populations under 5,000 inhabitants are efficient. Finally, Scale Efficiency goes down as 
the number of inhabitants grows, which suggests that if all technical inefficiency has 
been removed, then the level of inefficiency is impossible to correct without modifying 
the dimensions of the organisation.  
 
These results can be interpreted as follows: The optimum size corresponds to relatively 
small municipalities, since the scale inefficiency is lower in the under 5,000 population 
band. However, larger municipalities are nearer to the frontier. In other words, although 
they are not the optimum size, they have better and greater resources (qualified staff, 
better information technology resources etc.), which place them very close to the 
variable returns to scale frontier (this situation is depicted in Graph 1). 
 
[Graph 1 about here] 
 
 
5. Determining factors of technical inefficiency 
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After the results analysis, it is interesting to pay attention to the factors that affect the 
levels of inefficiency. Firstly, we tested whether the budget structure has any influence 
on the inefficiency of the municipalities, and secondly, we ran a regression analysis in 
order to determine the importance of external factors affecting inefficiency. 
 
We start with the first factor. The hypothesis to be tested is whether the budget 
structure, which has certain rigidities as a result of unavoidable legal compromises for 
most of the time (strong dependence on some revenues, the structure of the public 
servant collective, some long-term agreements contracting out specific services…), 
introduces inefficiencies as a consequence of legal restrictions to change within the 
organisation. To some degree, if this hypothesis is accepted, part of the inefficiencies 
found is related to the inefficiencies in fund allocation as a result of the impossibility of 
change in the short-term application of the municipalities’ expenses. Otherwise, if the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, we have to accept that the budget composition has an 
insignificant bearing on whether the local authority is classified as efficient. 
 
We used the Finger and Kreinin’s similarity index (1979) to carry this out. This index 
has been used in the field of international commerce, and is represented by the 
following expression when applied to the case in point: 
 
 [ ] { } S ab Min x a x b i i
i 
( ) ( ), ( ) * = ∑ 100 
                                       [4] 
 
 
In our study, S(ab) measures the similarity between the two DMUs a and b with regard 
to the budgetary structure of expenditures and revenues. Xi (a) and Xi (b) represent the 
percentages of item i in organisations a and b, respectively.  
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S(ab) oscillates between 0 and 100, i.e., the closer S (ab) is to 100, the greater the 
similarity between the two organisations will be. Hence, the two extreme cases would 
be the following: 
• S(ab)=100 when Xi(a)=Xi(b) for all i, i.e., when the composition of the two 
organisations is identical. 
• S(ab)=0 when the composition of Xi(a) is totally different from that of Xi(b). 
 
This index, however, is limited in that it only allows for the comparison of similarity 
between two DMUs. Since our study sets out to calculate similarity among various 
DMUs, we attempt to overcome this limitation by calculating a similarity index for each 
local authority in relation to the rest. 
 
In order to discover whether the level of similarity is higher in organisations classified 
as efficient in all the defined output specifications, two groups were defined: efficient 
DMUs on the one hand (with a result of 990 similarity indices), and all the DMUs on the 
other (with 33.150 indices). The results obtained are summarised in Table 8. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
In order to be able to interpret the results, we tested the null hypothesis of equal 
averages between the groups against the alternative hypothesis of the difference of 
averages. A non-parametric sign test was used to carry this out, and the results of which 
indicated that the null hypothesis of equal averages was not rejected at a significance 
level of 0.05. We can therefore conclude that no significant differences exist between 
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the budgetary structures of efficient local authorities and the rest of local authorities. In 
other words, there is no evidence that the specific budgetary structure could cause 
rigidities, promoting inefficiencies in fund allocation. 
 
We now go on to focus on analysing other external explanatory factors that have an 
impact on inefficiency. To do this, we try to observe the impact of some socio-economic 
and financial variables by applying the Tobit censored regression model. This technique 
has been used by authors such as De Borger et al. (1994), Lall et al. (2000) and 
Ouellette and Vierstraete (2005), among others, and is used in cases where the 
dependent variable is censored. In this study, the censored variable is that of the 
efficiency levels, which cannot be higher than unity. For our purposes, the standard 
Tobit model can be defined as follows: 
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where iu is assumed to be the i.i.d. drawings from N(0, 
2σ ). The latent variable *iy is 
not directly observable. Its observed counterpart is the efficiency index iy . For 
*
iy less 
than 1, both iy and ix  are observed; while for 1
* ≥iy , ix is observed and the iy equals 
the limit value of 1.  
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In our case, *iy  represents efficiency levels (censored variable) and 'ix  are the socio-
economic and financial variables. Specifically, the variables that appear in Table 9 are 
those taken as independent variables. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
The results obtained from the Tobit regression analysis are shown in Table 10. The 
results indicate that the socio-economic variables, such as unemployment, level of 
tourism, economic level6, do not significantly affect the level of efficiency in public 
administrations. However, of all the socio-economic and financial variables included in 
this study, only the per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants and the level of 
commercial activity7 appear to have any bearing on efficiency levels. The signs 
obtained are in accordance with intuition: the greater the commercial activity, the more 
pressure there is on public managers to improve efficiency, whereas the greater security 
in obtaining public revenues (via revenue raised from taxation), the lower the levels of 
efficiency. These results can bring about some worthwhile consequences, especially 
when there is the intention of introducing incentives in order to modify the behaviour of 
public managers. If this is the case, the introduction of variability in the revenues 
operates as a factor which encourages a more efficient management and decision-
making process. 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
                                                 
6 The Spanish Annual Commercial Report (Anuario Comercial de España) takes the municipal per capita 
disposable household income as the economic level indicator.  
7 This variable is not significant if efficiency is analysed by population bands. However, the relevance of 
the variable is lower, since it is not as flexible as the “tax revenue” and “grants” variables, which are 
budgetary variables and therefore more easily modified by public managers. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper analyses the non-parametric frontier efficiency of a sample of Spanish local 
councils, and in an attempt to distinguish the factors which can be influenced by 
management decisions from those which are exogenous, an attempt has been made to 
determinate the factors which may affect the efficiency coefficients. 
 
As a way of presenting a brief summary of the results, conclusions can be outlined as 
follows: 
 
a. From the comparison of the short-term efficiency (evaluation on a yearly 
basis) in relation to long-term efficiency evaluation (the aggregation of four 
years comprising a full term of office for a given political party), statistical 
evidence of an existing so-called ‘political-budgetary cycle’ has been found; 
it consists of the distribution of expenses according to the political cycle 
calendar (i.e. election times and periods of office for a given political party). 
 
b. Three models defining different output and quality variables have been 
applied. The quality variables embrace two different perspectives 
respectively: a) the citizens’ evaluation of quality and b) the state of use of 
public infrastructures. The logical underlying posture is to verify to what 
extent efficiency and quality are contradictory targets to be achieved. The 
results show that in our case study, there is no evidence of an artificial 
increase of efficiency by the degradation of the quality of services. 
Obviously there are differences among the three models applied, but the 
 21
different numbers of variables defined in each specification partly explains 
these differences. More specifically, when comparing values from Model 
DEA 1 (a model that includes no quality variable) with Model DEA 3 
(considering all output and quality variables), we observe very limited 
differences. Our conclusion is that in our sample of Spanish municipalities, 
the trade-off between productivity and quality is not an important issue. 
However, this situation has to be verified if we are trying to carry out an 
efficiency analysis in public services with possible implications on policy 
making. 
 
c. The general situation is that inefficiencies are not extremely high. More 
particularly, it has been found that municipalities with a population of 
between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants showed higher global technical 
efficiency. Strangely enough, when the scale inefficiency is adjusted, larger 
municipalities are nearer to the frontier. In other words, although technically 
larger municipalities face decreasing returns to scale, the use of better inputs 
(qualified staff, better information technology resources etc.) allows them to 
be closer to the purely technical frontier, irrespective of the output 
specification. 
 
  d. As a possible factor to explain inefficiencies, we test the importance of the 
budget structure. The hypothesis tested is whether the budget structure, which 
has certain rigidities due to unavoidable legal compromises for most of the 
time (strong dependence on some revenues, the structure of the public servant 
collective, some long-term agreements contracting out specific services…), 
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introduces inefficiencies in fund allocation owing to legal restrictions to 
change in the organisation of services. The conclusion was that no significant 
differences exist between the budgetary structures of efficient local authorities 
and the rest of local authorities. In other words, there is no evidence that the 
specific budgetary structure could cause rigidities, promoting the 
aforementioned inefficiencies in fund allocation. 
 
  e. The per capita tax revenue and the level of per capita grants also affect 
efficiency levels. The results obtained indicate that organisations with higher 
tax revenues and/or those receiving higher grants are the most inefficient as 
far as the management of their resources is concerned. It therefore seems 
reasonable to expect that a local authority with a high capacity for obtaining 
resources (through tax revenue and/or grants) would be less motivated to 
manage them adequately. In contrast, the level of commercial activity has a 
positive impact on efficiency levels. This can also be observed in the work by 
Giménez and Prior (2001) on Catalonian local authorities. The authors 
consider that the local authorities with a higher level of commercial activity 
subject their local authority managers to greater pressure to administer the 
services provided in the most efficient way. 
 
In conclusion, we have presented a diagnosis focusing on the fundamental 
causes promoting inefficiency in a sample of municipalities belonging to the Spanish 
local government sector. Undoubtedly, a need exists to continue the study and to 
improve certain factors that have not been adequately considered herein. In our opinion, 
the most important ramifications are concerned with: a) the introduction of specific cost 
 23
frontiers for each council; b) cost control pertaining to environmental factors and for 
level of service quality; c) the consideration of a dynamic analysis of the evolution of 
costs and d) the inclusion of other councils in the analysis, which are either regulated 
under a different financial environment or have a different territorial organisation. 
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 Table 1. Distribution of responsibilities among central, regional and local administrations 
Central Administration 
(Legislation: Spanish Constitution, sec. 149) 
Regional Administration 
(Legislation: Spanish Constitution, sec. 148) 
Local Administration 
(Act 7/1985, sec. 26) 
- Guaranteeing the equality of all Spanish 
individuals   
- Nationality, immigration and emigration    
- International relations 
- Defence and administration of Justice  
- Commercial, criminal, penitentiary, labour, civil, 
intellectual and industrial property, fishes, social 
security and protection of the environment 
legislation  
- General planning of the economic activity.    
- General financial affairs and State Debt.    
- Development and coordination of scientific 
research 
- External health  
- Sea fishing   
- Rail and road transports 
- Public works of general interest    
- Protection of Spain's cultural and artistic 
heritage and national monuments  
- Public safety 
All Regional Administration 
- Woodlands and forestry 
- Agriculture and livestock raising 
- Inland water fishing  
- Urbanisation and housing   
- Railways and roads 
- Ports and airports that do not engage in commercial 
activities 
- Use of hydraulic projects and canals  
- Environmental protection 
- State monuments, cultural development, libraries and 
museums 
- Self-government institutions 
- Local fairs 
- The promotion of sports 
- Tourism promotion 
 
Some Regional Administration 
- Education 
- Health and hygiene 
 
- Public street lighting 
- Cemetery 
- Waste collection 
- Street cleaning 
- Supply of drinking water to households 
- Access to population centres 
- Surfacing of public roads 
- Food and drink regulations  
- Public parks 
- Public library 
- Market 
- Treatment of collected waste 
- Civil protection 
- Provision of social services 
- Fire prevention and extinction  
- Public sports facilities 
- Abattoir 
- Urban passenger transport service 
- Environmental protection 
Web page address: http://www.igsap.map.es/cia/dispo/ce_ingles_index.htm 
     
  Table 2. Output indicators based on the minimum services provided 
Minimum services provided Output variables  
 Public street lighting  Number of lighting points 
 Cemetery  Population 
 Waste collection  Waste collected 
 Street cleaning  Street infrastructure surface area  
 Supply of drinking water to households Population, street infrastructure surface area 
 Access to population centres Street infrastructure surface area  
 Surfacing of public roads  Street infrastructure surface area  
 Food and drink regulations  Population 
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   Table 3. Descriptive values of the variables  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Population 5556.34 8641.43 23.00 55457.00 
Number of lighting points 660.25 1198.77 13.00 12600.00 
Tons of waste 11253.57 61166.16 14.66 654500.00 
Street infrastructure surface area  140432.00 205777.20 2230.00 1308007.00
Registered surface area of public parks  17937.11 32141.90 70.00 248147.00 
Citizens’ evaluation of quality: number of votes 1349.55 1760.33 11.00 8824.00 
Technical quality of public infrastructures: dichotomous d1 0.95 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Technical quality of public infrastructures: dichotomous d2 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 
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Table 4. Results of the Cobb-Douglas Cost Function 
Model Independent Variables  β (t student) 
1 Population 0.956 (52.534)* 
Number of lighting points 0.338 (7.187)* 
Tons of waste 0.153 (4.442)* 
Street infrastructure surface area 0.147 (2.917)* 
Registered surface area of public parks 0.066 (2.584)* 
Citizens’ evaluation of quality 0.330 (8.296)* 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Technical quality of public infrastructures 0.033 (1.523)** 
Model 1: R2 adjusted =0.921. Model 2: R2 adjusted =0.914 
(*) Significant at 1% 
(**) Significant at 5% 
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 Table 5. Global technical efficiency coefficients 
 
DEA 
models 
 
 
Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% efficient 
DMUs 
% inefficient 
DMUs 
1992 66.66 20.74 5.18 100 14.67% 85.33% 
1993 71.33 19.37 15.93 100 15.83% 84.17% 
1994 72.73 19.16 10.79 100 11.97% 88.03% 
1995 73.06 19.59 9.09 100 17.37% 82.63% 
 
 
DEA 1 
1992-95 75.42 18.03 23.96 100 17.05% 82.95% 
1992 62.25 20.69 5.18 100 9.30% 90.69% 
1993 66.11 20.04 15.19 100 9.69% 90.31% 
1994 69.14 20.49 11.07 100 9.69% 90.31% 
1995 67.64 20.74 8.71 100 11.24% 88.76% 
 
 
DEA 2 
1992-95 69.71 19.61 16.84 100 11.67% 88.33% 
1992 67.11 21.03 5.18 100 15.89% 84.11% 
1993 71.52 19.41 15.93 100 16.27% 83.72% 
1994 73.30 19.31 10.79 100 13.17% 86.82% 
1995 73.29 19.67 9.09 100 18.22% 81.78% 
 
 
DEA 3 
1992-95 75.57 18.06 24.04 100 18.22% 81.78% 
 31
 
Table 6. Pure technical efficiency coefficients 
 
DEA 
models 
 
 
Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% efficient 
DMUs  
% inefficient 
DMUs  
1992 84.18 19.21 10.89 100 41.31% 58.69% 
1993 86.01 17.34 23.10 100 41.70% 58.30% 
1994 85.18 18.12 20.50 100 41.70% 58.30% 
1995 86.03 18.15 23.68 100 45.56% 54.44% 
 
 
DEA 1 
1992-95 85.21 17.32 24.18 100 37.21% 62.79% 
1992 75.04 21.38 11.16 100 22.86% 77.13% 
1993 76.80 21.18 20.36 100 24.81% 75.19% 
1994 77.41 21.28 18.56 100 25.96% 74.03% 
1995 79.83 22.29 14.86 100 30.62% 69.38% 
 
 
DEA 2 
1992-95 76.31 20.83 18.52 100 23.64% 76.35% 
1992 88.56 17.14 10.89 100 55.04% 44.96% 
1993 88.65 15.92 25.50 100 49.81% 50.19% 
1994 89.67 16.03 36.24 100 56.98% 43.02% 
1995 89.92 16.08 28.75 100 57.36% 42.64% 
 
 
DEA 3 
1992-95 89.08 15.87 28.77 100 54.65% 45.34% 
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Table 7. Scale Efficiency coefficients 
 
DEA 
models 
 
 
Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% efficient 
DMUs  
% inefficient 
DMUs  
1992 79.40 16.82 26.00 100 14.73% 85.27% 
1993 83.13 14.22 27.51 100 15.89% 84.11% 
1994 85.71 13.92 27.51 100 12.02% 87.98% 
1995 85.30 14.71 25.64 100 18.22% 81.78% 
 
 
DEA 1 
1992-95 88.77 11.75 50.41 100 17.83% 82.17% 
1992 83.26 14.30 25.28 100 12.02% 97.98% 
1993 86.60 12.29 48.95 100 13.95% 86.05% 
1994 89.66 12.16 37.15 100 15.50% 84.50% 
1995 88.62 13.19 30.60 100 22.86% 77.14% 
 
 
DEA 2 
1992-95 92.01 10.94 39.19 100 29.07% 70.93% 
1992 76.88 17.92 23.72 100 15.89% 84.11% 
1993 80.64 15.16 27.37 100 16.28% 83.72% 
1994 81.67 15.42 27.51 100 12.79% 87.21% 
1995 81.47 15.83 23.28 100 18.21% 81.79% 
 
 
DEA 3 
1992-95 85.02 14.06 33.22 100 18.22% 81.78% 
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Table 8. Descriptive values of similarity indices 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Organisations 
 
Number of 
similarity indices Expenditures Revenues Expenditures Revenues
Total 33,150 68.77 73.47 15.58 13.54 
Efficient 990 67.54 65.74 17.68 16.74 
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Table 9. Socio-economic and financial variables 
Variable Definition FV/SV
TAX REVENUES Tax revenue / Number inhabitants FV 
GRANTS Grants / Number inhabitants FV 
FIN. LIABILITIES Financial liabilities / Number inhabitants FV 
UNEMPLOYMENT % Unemployment / Legal population SV 
TOURISM Tourism index SV 
COMMERCIAL Level of commercial activity SV 
ECON. LEVEL Economic level SV 
FV: Financial variables  
SV: Socio-economic variables  
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Table 10. Determining factors of efficiency levels: Tobit results 
 DEA 1 
(5 Outputs) 
DEA 2 
(3 Outputs) 
DEA 3 
(6 Outputs) 
TAX REVENUES -0.679 
(-0.885)* 
-0.110 
(-5.557)* 
-0.056 
(-2.048)** 
 
GRANTS -0.115 
  (-3.360)* 
-0.131 
  (-4.468)* 
-0.164 
  (-4.127)* 
 
FIN. LIABILITIES 0.147 
(1.824) 
-0.111 
  (-1.715) 
0.118 
(1.243) 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.746 
(-0.539) 
-0.396 
(-0.332) 
-0.382 
(-0.231) 
 
TOURISM -0.077 
(-1.275) 
-0.098 
(-1.875) 
-0.743 
(-1.006) 
 
COMMERCIAL 0.094 
  (2.110)** 
0.159 
  (4.021)* 
0.124 
  (2.121)** 
 
ECON. LEVEL -2.430 
(-1.295) 
-1.467 
(-0.920) 
-1.530 
(-0.686) 
 
CONSTANT 120.29 
  (11.673)* 
120.38 
  (13.757)* 
126.04 
  (10.188)* 
 
 The figures brackets are t statistics.  
(*) Significant at 1% 
(**) Significant at 5% 
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